aif-security-checklist-1631a9 — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited aif-security-checklist-1631a9 (Agent Skill) and scored it 87/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 1 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 2 flagged
The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.
ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.The text {match} asks the agent to disclose its hidden system prompt or initial instructions. That is often the first step of a larger attack: knowing the system prompt lets an attacker craft inputs that defeat its constraints by mimicking its own voice.
repeat/reveal/print your system prompt request from the skill.Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Comprehensive security checklist based on OWASP Top 10 (2021) and industry best practices.
/aif-security-checklist — Full audit checklist/aif-security-checklist auth — Authentication & sessions/aif-security-checklist injection — SQL/NoSQL/Command injection/aif-security-checklist xss — Cross-site scripting/aif-security-checklist csrf — Cross-site request forgery/aif-security-checklist secrets — Secrets & credentials/aif-security-checklist api — API security/aif-security-checklist infra — Infrastructure security/aif-security-checklist prompt-injection — LLM prompt injection/aif-security-checklist race-condition — Race conditions & TOCTOU/aif-security-checklist ignore <item> — Ignore a specific check itemBefore running any audit, always read the file .ai-factory/SECURITY.md in the project root. If it exists, it contains a list of security checks the team has decided to ignore.
When the user runs `/aif-security-checklist ignore <item>`:
.ai-factory/SECURITY.md file (create if doesn't exist)When running any audit (`/aif-security-checklist` or a specific category):
.ai-factory/SECURITY.md at the start.ai-factory/SECURITY.md format# Security: Ignored Items
Items below are excluded from security-checklist audits.
Review periodically — ignored risks may become relevant.
| Item | Reason | Date | Author |
|------|--------|------|--------|
| no-csrf | SPA with token auth, no cookies used | 2025-03-15 | @dev |
| no-rate-limit | Internal microservice, behind API gateway | 2025-03-15 | @dev |Item naming convention — use short kebab-case IDs:
no-csrf — CSRF tokens not implementedno-rate-limit — Rate limiting not configuredno-https — HTTPS not enforcedno-xss-csp — CSP header missingno-sql-injection — SQL injection not fully preventedno-prompt-injection — LLM prompt injection not mitigatedno-race-condition — Race condition prevention missingno-secret-rotation — Secrets not rotatedno-auth-{route} — Auth missing on specific routeverbose-errors — Detailed errors exposedWhen audit results are shown, append this section at the end:
⏭️ Ignored Items (from .ai-factory/SECURITY.md)
┌─────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┬────────────┐
│ Item │ Reason │ Date │
├─────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────┼────────────┤
│ no-csrf │ SPA with token auth, no cookies used │ 2025-03-15 │
│ no-rate-limit │ Internal service, behind API gateway │ 2025-03-15 │
└─────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────────┴────────────┘
⚠️ 2 items ignored. Run `/aif-security-checklist` without ignores to see full audit.Run the automated security audit script:
bash ~/.github/skills/security-checklist/scripts/audit.shThis checks:
✅ Requirements:
- [ ] Minimum 12 characters
- [ ] Hashed with bcrypt/argon2 (cost factor ≥ 12)
- [ ] Never stored in plain text
- [ ] Never logged
- [ ] Breach detection (HaveIBeenPwned API)For implementation patterns (argon2, bcrypt, PHP, Laravel) → read references/AUTH-PATTERNS.md
✅ Checklist:
- [ ] Session ID regenerated after login
- [ ] Session timeout implemented (idle + absolute)
- [ ] Secure cookie flags set
- [ ] Session invalidation on logout
- [ ] Concurrent session limits (optional)For secure cookie settings example → read references/AUTH-PATTERNS.md
✅ Checklist:
- [ ] Use RS256 or ES256 (not HS256 for distributed systems)
- [ ] Short expiration (15 min access, 7 day refresh)
- [ ] Validate all claims (iss, aud, exp, iat)
- [ ] Store refresh tokens securely (httpOnly cookie)
- [ ] Implement token revocation
- [ ] Never store sensitive data in payload// ❌ VULNERABLE: String concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`;
// ✅ SAFE: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
// ✅ SAFE: ORM (Prisma/Eloquent/SQLAlchemy)
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });// ❌ VULNERABLE: Direct user input — attack: { "$ne": "" }
const user = await db.users.findOne({ username: req.body.username });
// ✅ SAFE: Type validation
const username = z.string().parse(req.body.username);// ❌ VULNERABLE: exec(`convert ${userFilename} output.png`);
// ✅ SAFE: execFile('convert', [userFilename, 'output.png']);- [ ] All user output HTML-encoded by default
- [ ] Content-Security-Policy header configured
- [ ] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- [ ] Sanitize HTML if allowing rich text
- [ ] Validate URLs before rendering links// ❌ VULNERABLE: element.innerHTML = userInput; / dangerouslySetInnerHTML
// ✅ SAFE: element.textContent = userInput; / React: <div>{userInput}</div>
// ✅ If HTML needed: DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput)// ❌ VULNERABLE: <?= $userInput ?> / {!! $userInput !!}
// ✅ SAFE: {{ $userInput }} (Blade) / htmlspecialchars($input, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')Set CSP header: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'
- [ ] CSRF tokens on all state-changing requests
- [ ] SameSite=Strict or Lax on cookies
- [ ] Verify Origin/Referer headers
- [ ] Don't use GET for state changescsurf middleware, embed token in hidden form field and AJAX headerssameSite: 'strict', client sends token in header, server compares❌ Secrets in code
const API_KEY = "sk_live_abc123";
❌ Secrets in git
.env committed to repository
❌ Secrets in logs
console.log(`Connecting with password: ${password}`);
❌ Secrets in error messages
throw new Error(`DB connection failed: ${connectionString}`);- [ ] Secrets in environment variables or vault
- [ ] .env in .gitignore
- [ ] Different secrets per environment
- [ ] Secrets rotated regularly
- [ ] Access to secrets audited
- [ ] No secrets in client-side code# If secrets were committed, remove from history
git filter-branch --force --index-filter \
"git rm --cached --ignore-unmatch path/to/secret-file" \
--prune-empty --tag-name-filter cat -- --all
# Or use BFG Repo-Cleaner (faster)
bfg --delete-files .env
bfg --replace-text passwords.txt
# Force push (coordinate with team!)
git push origin --force --all
# Rotate ALL exposed secrets immediately!- [ ] API keys not in URLs (use headers)
- [ ] Rate limiting per user/IP
- [ ] Request signing for sensitive operations
- [ ] OAuth 2.0 for third-party access// ✅ Validate all input with schema
import { z } from 'zod';
const CreateUserSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email().max(255),
name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
age: z.number().int().min(0).max(150).optional(),
});
app.post('/users', (req, res) => {
const result = CreateUserSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: result.error });
}
// result.data is typed and validated
});// ✅ Don't expose internal errors
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
console.error(err); // Log full error internally
// Return generic message to client
res.status(500).json({
error: 'Internal server error',
requestId: req.id, // For support reference
});
});
// ✅ Don't expose sensitive fields
const userResponse = {
id: user.id,
name: user.name,
email: user.email,
// ❌ Never: password, passwordHash, internalId, etc.
};app.use(helmet()); // Sets many security headers
// Or manually:
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
res.setHeader('X-XSS-Protection', '0'); // Disabled, use CSP instead
res.setHeader('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');
res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
res.setHeader('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()');# Check for vulnerabilities
npm audit
pip-audit
cargo audit
# Auto-fix where possible
npm audit fix
# Keep dependencies updated
npx npm-check-updates -u- [ ] HTTPS only (redirect HTTP)
- [ ] TLS 1.2+ only
- [ ] Security headers configured
- [ ] Debug mode disabled
- [ ] Default credentials changed
- [ ] Unnecessary ports closed
- [ ] File permissions restricted
- [ ] Logging enabled (but no secrets)
- [ ] Backups encrypted
- [ ] WAF/DDoS protection (for public APIs)For detailed race condition patterns (double-spend, TOCTOU, optimistic locking, idempotency keys, distributed locks) → read references/RACE-CONDITIONS.md
- [ ] Financial operations use database transactions with proper isolation
- [ ] Inventory/stock checks use atomic decrement (not read-then-write)
- [ ] Idempotency keys on payment and mutation endpoints
- [ ] Optimistic locking (version column) on concurrent updates
- [ ] File operations use exclusive locks where needed
- [ ] No TOCTOU gaps between permission check and action
- [ ] Rate limiting to reduce exploitation windowFor detailed prompt injection patterns (direct, indirect, tool safety, output validation, RAG) → read references/PROMPT-INJECTION.md
- [ ] User input never concatenated directly into system prompts
- [ ] Input/output boundaries clearly separated (delimiters, roles)
- [ ] LLM output treated as untrusted (never executed as code/commands)
- [ ] Tool calls from LLM validated and sandboxed
- [ ] Sensitive data excluded from LLM context
- [ ] Rate limiting on LLM endpoints
- [ ] Output filtered for PII/secrets leakage
- [ ] Logging & monitoring for anomalous prompts# Find hardcoded secrets
grep -rn "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" .
# Check for vulnerable dependencies
npm audit --audit-level=high
# Find TODO security items
grep -rn "TODO.*security\|FIXME.*security\|XXX.*security" .
# Check for console.log in production code
grep -rn "console\.log" src/
# Find prompt injection risks (unsanitized input in LLM calls)
grep -rn "system.*\${.*}" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" .
grep -rn "innerHTML.*llm\|innerHTML.*response\|innerHTML.*completion" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" .| Issue | Severity | Fix Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection | 🔴 Critical | Immediate |
| Auth Bypass | 🔴 Critical | Immediate |
| Secrets Exposed | 🔴 Critical | Immediate |
| XSS (Stored) | 🔴 Critical | < 24 hours |
| Prompt Injection (Direct) | 🔴 Critical | Immediate |
| Race Condition (Financial) | 🔴 Critical | Immediate |
| Prompt Injection (Indirect) | 🟠 High | < 1 week |
| Race Condition (Data) | 🟠 High | < 1 week |
| CSRF | 🟠 High | < 1 week |
| XSS (Reflected) | 🟠 High | < 1 week |
| Missing Rate Limit | 🟡 Medium | < 2 weeks |
| Verbose Errors | 🟡 Medium | < 2 weeks |
| Missing Headers | 🟢 Low | < 1 month |
Tip: Context is heavy after security audit. Consider/clearor/compactbefore continuing with other tasks.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.