Forge Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Forge Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
The cross-manufacturer industrial MCP server. Talk to any CNC, robot, or industrial machine in natural language — machine identity, telemetry normalization across 46 vendor packs in 20 verticals, plain-English automation, and tamper-evident work records.
Hosted MCP over Streamable HTTP. 32 tools wrap the Forge v1 API: provision a stable machine identity, normalize raw OEM telemetry into a canonical schema, query operational history, parse and activate plain-English automations, predict failures (TimesFM), score fleet health, and record every state-changing action as a verifiable, tamper-evident work record.
https://mcp.foundrynet.io/mcphttps://mcp.foundrynet.io/ssehttps://mcp.foundrynet.io/healthhttps://mcp.foundrynet.io/.well-known/mcp/server-card.jsonIt normalizes raw OEM telemetry from 18 manufacturer families into one canonical vocabulary with thousands of confirmed field mappings — so an agent writes against one set of field names whether the machine is a Fanuc CNC, a KUKA arm, or a Universal Robots cobot. On top of that it turns plain-English instructions into structured automations (review then activate), and records every state-changing action as a tamper-evident work record.
Pure HTTP proxy. Every tool is a thin wrapper around https://forge.foundrynet.io/v1/*. No state, no shared imports with forge-prod — separate Railway service, separate dependencies (fastmcp + httpx).
Claude Desktop / agent
│ Streamable HTTP (/mcp) — or legacy SSE (/sse)
│ Authorization: Bearer <the CALLER's Forge API key>
▼
foundrynet-mcp on Railway
│ gate: validate key → tier → cap → bind caller
│ HTTPS, Authorization: Bearer <the SAME caller's key>
│ X-Forge-Caller-Key-Id: <their forge_api_keys.id>
▼
forge.foundrynet.io/v1/* — scopes every row to that callerTenancy. The upstream call is made as the CALLER, not as this server. It used to be made with the server's own FOUNDRYNET_API_KEY for every caller, with no caller named: forge-prod scopes rows to the authenticated key's owner, so every MCP tenant read and wrote inside one shared Forge account — and fleet_oee, shift_report, list_agents and prediction_accuracy take no machine argument, so they returned that whole account. The upstream hop now REFUSES to run when it cannot name the caller: there is no fallback, because the only fallback is the shared key. OAuth access tokens carry a key id but not a key, so they cannot be presented upstream and are refused on tool calls with tenant_context_unavailable.
POST /a2a/tasks and GET /a2a/agents go through the same gate function (gating.enforce_call) as tools/call, by skill→tool mapping. They previously authenticated the caller and then dispatched with no tier check, no cap and no payment gate, which made the A2A route a free pass to the paid inference tools.
python3 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt pytest pytest-asyncio
.venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q # 229 checks
scripts/release_gate.sh # tree, deps, import, suite, versionThe suite drives the real ASGI app over real Streamable HTTP through the real gate; only Supabase and the upstream hop are substituted, and the upstream substitute RECORDS requests, because what identity this server presents to forge-prod is the thing most worth asserting. tests/test_rest_mcp_parity.py measures free-tier parity against forge-prod's own _endpoint_to_billing_meter, read out of its source at test time rather than copied.
CI runs the whole tree on every push and pull request (.github/workflows/release-gate.yml, pinned to ubuntu-24.04): measured 223 passed, 6 skipped, 229 collected in 2m04s. The 6 skips are the checks that read forge-prod's api.py off the local disk — 5 parity plus the cost-ledger single-writer check — and they skip loudly, with their reason printed, because forge-prod is a separate private repo and is not on the runner. A visible skip beats a green tick over a check that was quietly dropped.
cd ~/forge-mcp && git checkout main && git pull --ff-only && ./deploy.shNever railway up by hand. deploy.sh does seven things in order, and five of them exist because of a specific way a deploy has gone wrong:
main — railway up uploadsthe WORKING TREE, so with uncommitted changes no commit describes what ships;
scripts/release_gate.sh and refuses if it is red. There is no overrideflag, deliberately;
~/.forge-mcp-deploy.lock, atomic mkdir) so twoconcurrent deploys cannot race on the upload and on the verification;
railway up would archive the wrong directory. It archives theCLOSEST LINKED project directory from ~/.railway/config.json, walking UP — not $PWD. This directory once inherited $HOME's link, which names a DIFFERENT SERVICE;
stamp_build.py, which writes build_info.json (commit, dirty state,content_hash over the uploaded file set, build time);
railway up --service 162115b7-… — the id is explicit, because a barerailway up resolves the service from that same ancestor link;
https://mcp.foundrynet.io/health until build.commit_short ANDbuild.content_hash both equal the stamp it just wrote, then asserts the status. Railway reporting SUCCESS only means the upload and build succeeded — a crash-looping new container leaves the OLD one serving and the deploy looks fine. content_hash is checked as well as the commit because railway up uploads a tree: the same commit with a different tree is a different deployment.
/health carries a build block using the same key names as forge-prod's, so one verifier reads both services. When build_info.json is absent it says so in words — build_info.json absent — deploy did not run stamp_build.py, with commit, content_hash and built_at present and null — because a null that looks like a missing field is indistinguishable from a stamped build.
Identity & data: identify_machine, normalize_telemetry, query_machine_history, get_coverage, correct_mapping. Automation: create_automation, activate_automation, list_automations, disable_automation, delete_automation, restore_automation, query_webhook_history. Prediction (TimesFM): predict, predict_breach, remaining_life, predict_batch, fleet_health, detect_anomalies, machine_intelligence, prediction_accuracy. Operations: calculate_oee, fleet_oee, energy_consumption, shift_report, diagnose_machine, health_index. Guardrails: check_guardrail, list_guardrails. Agents on your kernel: get_agent_card, list_agents. Work records: verify_record. Demo: fire_sandbox (the full watch → fire → settle loop, no card).
get_agent_card and list_agents are scoped to the agents connected to your kernel instance (their capabilities, trust scores, and machine access) and are included in your subscription — there is no per-call charge. They are operational tools for coordinating agents on your own equipment, not cross-platform discovery. For cross-platform agent trust across any framework, see Assay (assay.foundrynet.io). verify_record creates a tamper-evident, hash-verified record of completed work.
Free tier exposes the read-only tools; metered pay-per-use unlocks the premium prediction and diagnostics tools (see https://forge.foundrynet.io/pricing?utm_source=github&utm_medium=readme&utm_campaign=forge-mcp-readme).
claude mcp add --transport http foundrynet-forge \
https://mcp.foundrynet.io/mcp \
--header "Authorization: Bearer fnet_YOUR_KEY"Or via claude_desktop_config.json with the mcp-remote bridge:
{
"mcpServers": {
"foundrynet-forge": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-remote",
"https://mcp.foundrynet.io/mcp",
"--header", "Authorization:Bearer ${FNET_KEY}"],
"env": { "FNET_KEY": "fnet_… (get a free key at foundrynet.io/signup)" }
}
}
}Legacy SSE (--transport sse against https://mcp.foundrynet.io/sse) remains supported for existing configs, but new integrations should use the Streamable HTTP /mcp endpoint above.
Get a free fnet_ key at https://foundrynet.io/signup?utm_source=github&utm_medium=readme&utm_campaign=forge-mcp-readme (50 normalize calls, no card).
| Var | Required | Default |
|---|---|---|
FOUNDRYNET_API_KEY | No longer used on the tool path | Kept for the boot-time config report only; tool calls run as the caller's own key |
SUPABASE_URL / SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY | Yes for gating | unset = gating disabled, fail-open |
MCP_JWT_SECRET | No | unset = OAuth token issuance disabled (503), key auth unaffected |
FORGE_BASE_URL | No | https://forge.foundrynet.io |
PORT | No | 8080 (Railway sets this automatically) |
REQUEST_TIMEOUT | No | 120 (seconds) |
mcp_server.py — the server (32 tools + /health + /.well-known/mcp routes)gating.py — per-client tier gating (Free vs Pro tool/quota enforcement)server.json — MCP registry metadata (name, description, keywords, remote endpoint)smithery.yaml — Smithery listing metadatarequirements.txt — fastmcp>=3.4.5,<4, httpx>=0.27, PyJWT>=2.14.0, supabase, stripetests/ — the behavioural suite (auth, tenancy, parity, idempotency, cache scope)scripts/release_gate.sh — must be green on the exact commit before a deploydeploy.sh — the only path to production; gated, locked, stamped and verifiedstamp_build.py — writes build_info.json; what /health's build block reportsProcfile — Railway start command (stamps, then python mcp_server.py).github/workflows/release-gate.yml — CI; the whole suite on push and PRProprietary (commercial). © Foundry Labs LLC. Contact: [email protected]
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.