Mcp Server Template — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Mcp Server Template (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
A minimal, correct, and security-first Model Context Protocol (MCP) server in Python. It exposes three example tools to any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, etc.) — each one shipped with the security guard it actually needs.
Most "MCP server" tutorials show you how to expose a tool. They skip the part that matters once a model has real hands on your database, network, and disk. This template is built around that gap: how to give an LLM capabilities without opening a hole.
LLM client ──MCP──> this server ──> [ PostgreSQL | HTTP | filesystem ]
│
└── every tool passes through guards.py (tested)MCP is an open protocol that lets an AI client call external "tools" (functions) and read "resources" through a standard interface. You run a small server that declares tools; the client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, …) discovers them and the model calls them during a conversation. It's the clean way to give a model access to your data and actions instead of pasting everything into the prompt.
| Tool | What it does | Guard |
|---|---|---|
db_query(sql) | Run a read-only SQL query against DATABASE_URL, returns rows as JSON | SELECT/WITH only and a real READ ONLY Postgres session |
http_get(url) | HTTP GET, returns the body as text | http/https only + host allowlist, deny-by-default (anti-SSRF) |
read_file(path) | Read a text file under MCP_FILES_ROOT | Path resolved inside the root, blocks `../` traversal & absolute paths |
is_safe_select — rejects writes, DDL, and stacked ; statements) and the connection is opened READ ONLY, so even a clever bypass can't mutate data.http(s), and the host must be in MCP_URL_ALLOWLIST. Empty allowlist = nothing allowed (deny-by-default), so a misconfigured server isn't an open proxy.MCP_FILES_ROOT; ../, absolute paths, and symlink escapes raise.All three guards live in guards.py (zero dependencies) and are covered by tests/test_guards.py, so they run without even installing MCP.
git clone <this repo> && cd mcp-server-template
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/Scripts/activate # (Linux/mac: . .venv/bin/activate)
pip install -e . # add: pip install -e ".[db]" for PostgreSQL
cp .env.example .env # edit with your values
python server.py # runs over stdioAdd to your claude_desktop_config.json (see claude_desktop_config.example.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"atelier-template": {
"command": "python",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/server.py"],
"env": { "MCP_URL_ALLOWLIST": "api.github.com", "MCP_FILES_ROOT": "/safe/dir" }
}
}
}Restart Claude Desktop; the three tools appear. (For Claude Code: claude mcp add atelier-template -- python /abs/path/server.py.)
@mcp.tool()
def word_count(text: str) -> str:
"""Count words in a string.""" # <- this docstring is what the model reads
return str(len(text.split()))That's the whole loop: decorate a function, write a clear docstring (the model uses it to decide when/how to call), return a string. If the tool touches data/network/disk, add a guard — that's the habit this template is trying to teach.
server.py # the MCP server + 3 example tools
guards.py # pure, dependency-free security helpers (tested)
tests/ # pytest for the guards (run without mcp installed)
.env.example # configurationpip install pytest && pytest -qMIT © 2026 Eduardo Pérez Ignacio
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.