Ai Plugins Cc— plugin

Ai Plugins Cc — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Ai Plugins Cc safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Ai Plugins Cc (Plugin) and scored it 65/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 38 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
65/100
●●●●●●●○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (65 → 65)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 29d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings38 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 38 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 38 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/ai/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/ai/commands/setup.md· markdown
52### Gemini
53 
54If `available: false`, the user already opted in by selecting Gemini — don't ask again, just
… (9 chars elided on L54)
55- Tell them once: *"Installing Gemini CLI (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`)…"*
56- Run `npm install -g @google/gemini-cli` via Bash.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24frubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md· markdown
20 
21Execution mode rules:
22- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run in the foreground.
23- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run in a Claude background task.
24- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L22, also L23
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L22
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md
L23
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md×4
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md· markdown
19- `--background` and `--wait` are execution flags for Claude Code. Do not forward them to `t
… (70 chars elided on L19)
20- `--model` is a runtime-selection flag. Preserve it for the forwarded `task` call, but do n
… (54 chars elided on L20)
21- If the request includes `--resume`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose
… (1 chars elided on L21)
22- If the request includes `--fresh`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose.
23- Otherwise, before starting Gemini, check for a resumable rescue transcript from this Claud
… (21 chars elided on L23)
Occurrences
4 occurrences · first at L21, also L22, L37 +1 more
Show all 4 locations
Line
File
L21
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L22
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L37
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L52
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/gemini/commands/review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/gemini/commands/review.md· markdown
17 
18Execution mode rules:
19- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run the review in the foreground.
20- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run the review in a Claude backgr
… (10 chars elided on L20)
21- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L19, also L20
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L19
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/review.md
L20
dist/plugins/gemini/commands/review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/gemini/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/gemini/commands/setup.md· markdown
30 
31If the Gemini CLI is already installed or npm is unavailable:
32- Do not ask about installation.
33 
34Output rules:
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L32
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md· markdown
20 
21Execution mode rules:
22- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run in the foreground.
23- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run in a Claude background task.
24- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L22, also L23
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L22
dist/plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md
L23
dist/plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md×4
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md· markdown
19- `--background` and `--wait` are execution flags for Claude Code. Do not forward them to `t
… (70 chars elided on L19)
20- `--model` is a runtime-selection flag. Preserve it for the forwarded `task` call, but do n
… (54 chars elided on L20)
21- If the request includes `--resume`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose
… (1 chars elided on L21)
22- If the request includes `--fresh`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose.
23- Otherwise, before starting Grok, check for a resumable rescue transcript from this Claude
… (19 chars elided on L23)
Occurrences
4 occurrences · first at L21, also L22, L37 +1 more
Show all 4 locations
Line
File
L21
dist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L22
dist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L37
dist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L52
dist/plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/grok/commands/review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/grok/commands/review.md· markdown
17 
18Execution mode rules:
19- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run the review in the foreground.
20- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run the review in a Claude backgr
… (10 chars elided on L20)
21- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L19, also L20
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L19
dist/plugins/grok/commands/review.md
L20
dist/plugins/grok/commands/review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · dist/plugins/grok/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdist/plugins/grok/commands/setup.md· markdown
30 
31If the Grok CLI is already installed or npm is unavailable:
32- Do not ask about installation.
33 
34Output rules:
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L32
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/ai/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/ai/commands/setup.md· markdown
52### Gemini
53 
54If `available: false`, the user already opted in by selecting Gemini — don't ask again, just
… (9 chars elided on L54)
55- Tell them once: *"Installing Gemini CLI (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`)…"*
56- Run `npm install -g @google/gemini-cli` via Bash.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L54
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24frubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md· markdown
20 
21Execution mode rules:
22- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run in the foreground.
23- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run in a Claude background task.
24- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L22, also L23
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L22
plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md
L23
plugins/gemini/commands/adversarial-review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md×4
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md· markdown
19- `--background` and `--wait` are execution flags for Claude Code. Do not forward them to `t
… (70 chars elided on L19)
20- `--model` is a runtime-selection flag. Preserve it for the forwarded `task` call, but do n
… (54 chars elided on L20)
21- If the request includes `--resume`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose
… (1 chars elided on L21)
22- If the request includes `--fresh`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose.
23- Otherwise, before starting Gemini, check for a resumable rescue transcript from this Claud
… (21 chars elided on L23)
Occurrences
4 occurrences · first at L21, also L22, L37 +1 more
Show all 4 locations
Line
File
L21
plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L22
plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L37
plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
L52
plugins/gemini/commands/rescue.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/gemini/commands/review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/gemini/commands/review.md· markdown
17 
18Execution mode rules:
19- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run the review in the foreground.
20- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run the review in a Claude backgr
… (10 chars elided on L20)
21- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L19, also L20
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L19
plugins/gemini/commands/review.md
L20
plugins/gemini/commands/review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/gemini/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/gemini/commands/setup.md· markdown
30 
31If the Gemini CLI is already installed or npm is unavailable:
32- Do not ask about installation.
33 
34Output rules:
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L32
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md· markdown
20 
21Execution mode rules:
22- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run in the foreground.
23- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run in a Claude background task.
24- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L22, also L23
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L22
plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md
L23
plugins/grok/commands/adversarial-review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md×4
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/grok/commands/rescue.md· markdown
19- `--background` and `--wait` are execution flags for Claude Code. Do not forward them to `t
… (70 chars elided on L19)
20- `--model` is a runtime-selection flag. Preserve it for the forwarded `task` call, but do n
… (54 chars elided on L20)
21- If the request includes `--resume`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose
… (1 chars elided on L21)
22- If the request includes `--fresh`, do not ask whether to continue. The user already chose.
23- Otherwise, before starting Grok, check for a resumable rescue transcript from this Claude
… (19 chars elided on L23)
Occurrences
4 occurrences · first at L21, also L22, L37 +1 more
Show all 4 locations
Line
File
L21
plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L22
plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L37
plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
L52
plugins/grok/commands/rescue.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/grok/commands/review.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/grok/commands/review.md· markdown
17 
18Execution mode rules:
19- If the raw arguments include `--wait`, do not ask. Run the review in the foreground.
20- If the raw arguments include `--background`, do not ask. Run the review in a Claude backgr
… (10 chars elided on L20)
21- Otherwise, estimate the review size before asking:
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L19, also L20
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L19
plugins/grok/commands/review.md
L20
plugins/grok/commands/review.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25612211d7a427c799arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · plugins/grok/commands/setup.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptplugins/grok/commands/setup.md· markdown
30 
31If the Grok CLI is already installed or npm is unavailable:
32- Do not ask about installation.
33 
34Output rules:
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L32
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484arubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
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Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
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