Dynatrace Managed Mcp— agent skill

Dynatrace Managed Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by dynatrace-oss·Agent Skill·github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-managed-mcp

Is Dynatrace Managed Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Dynatrace Managed Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 2 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 2 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
38
13.3 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 38 · 3 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · src/capabilities/__tests__/resources/listProblems.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/capabilities/__tests__/resources/listProblems.json· json
1{
2"nextPageKey": "AQANMTc2NDAxMTg1NTM4NgEADTE3NjQwMTkwNTUzODYBADJMb25nKDApLUxvbmcoMTlhNDkzMTAy
… (54 chars elided on L2)
3"pageSize": 1,
4"problems": [
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L2
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha2566f3a4b878d084d38…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · src/capabilities/__tests__/resources/queryEvents.json
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptsrc/capabilities/__tests__/resources/queryEvents.json· json
77}
78],
79"nextPageKey": "AQANMTc2MzkzMjY1MTUwOAEADTE3NjQwMTkwNTE1MDgBADtTdHJpbmcoVDFCRlRnPT0pLUxvbmco
… (62 chars elided on L79)
80"pageSize": 1,
81"totalCount": 386,
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L79
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256d1cd01b49f82a1a6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · .github/instructions/changelog.instructions.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpt.github/instructions/changelog.instructions.md· markdown
11- Release candidates are supported with version suffix format (e.g., `0.5.0-rc.1` should be
… (58 chars elided on L11)
12- Do not use subheadings
13- Do not mention commit hashes
14- Write in past tense (e.g., "improved", "introduced", "added")
15- Balance technical accuracy with user-facing language
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L13
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25626f8feb82a1bf179…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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