Roslyn Backed Mcp— plugin

Roslyn Backed Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Roslyn Backed Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Roslyn Backed Mcp (Plugin) and scored it 45/100 (orange). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 19 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
45/100
●●●●●○○○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 19 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 20 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 20 findings
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json×12
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json· json
101{
102"type": "text",
103"text": "{\r\n \"count\": 6,\r\n \"totalCount\": 6,\r\n \"hasMore\": false,\r\n \"offset
… (102 chars elided on L103)
104}
105]
Occurrences
12 occurrences · first at L103, also L103, L103 +9 more
Show all 12 locations
Line
File
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L103
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
L123
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run1.transcript.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256616f2db1e2df303b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json×6
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json· json
32{
33"type": "text",
34"text": "{\r\n \"count\": 6,\r\n \"totalCount\": 6,\r\n \"hasMore\": false,\r\n \"offset
… (102 chars elided on L34)
35}
36]
Occurrences
6 occurrences · first at L34, also L34, L34 +3 more
Show all 6 locations
Line
File
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
L34
ai_docs/audits/20260930-1340/evidence/run2.transcript.json
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256616f2db1e2df303b…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHLong base64-encoded blob hidden in the skill documentationSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01 · Prompt injection · ai_docs/items/external-overload-candidate-handle-roundtrip.md
HIGH — once decoded by the agent, an encoded payload has the same impact class as plain-text injection.
Why it matters

A base64 string of 128+ characters appears in a documentation file. Encoded prompt injection hides the hostile instruction in base64 — invisible to keyword filters — and relies on the agent's ability to decode it at runtime. There is no normal authoring reason to embed a multi-hundred-byte base64 blob in skill docs.

The exact value spotted
excerptai_docs/items/external-overload-candidate-handle-roundtrip.md· markdown
21 
22```text
23eyJNZXRhZGF0YU5hbWUiOm51bGwsIkRpc3BsYXlOYW1lIjoiU3lzdGVtLkRpYWdub3N0aWNzLlByb2Nlc3MuS2lsbChi
… (64 chars elided on L23)
24```
25 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L23
How to fix
Remove the encoded blob, or decode it and review what it actually contains.
  1. Decode the base64 string and confirm it is not an instruction directed at the agent.
  2. Move any legitimate binary or signature data into a dedicated file (*.sig, SIGNATURES) outside the documentation.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-B64-PAYLOAD-01sha256eb0a16f72a2788ee…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · agents/audit-phase-runner.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptagents/audit-phase-runner.md· markdown
41- If a phase needs a long shell validation, summarize only the final exit code, elapsed time
… (33 chars elided on L41)
42- Do not call any `*_apply`, `apply_*`, file-write, git-mutation, PR, or merge command.
43- Do not call `AskUserQuestion` under any circumstances. If input is insufficient (missing `
… (108 chars elided on L43)
44- Return one final structured summary and stop.
45 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L43
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25614b7852251bf4666…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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