Is Firmware Attestation Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Firmware Attestation Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution

Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval

35%

100

35.0 pts

Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile

20%

100

20.0 pts

Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI

15%

100

15.0 pts

TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README

15%

100

15.0 pts

Communityinstalls, verify, response

15%

100

15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 0 flagged

Securityscore 100 · 0 findings

✓—All security checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass

Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings

✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass

Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings

✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass

Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings

✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass

Communityscore 100 · 0 findings

✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass

The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.

README.md · 1 file

README.md2.2 KB · Markdown

Firmware Attestation MCP

Hardware trust layer for sovereign AI. Persistence implants live below the OS (BIOS/UEFI, SMM, network boot ROMs, HDD HPA) and survive OS reinstalls and disk wipes. This MCP attests a host's firmware trust state and gates inference on a verified result.

Tools

Tool	What
`scan_firmware`	read-only host evidence (Secure Boot, TPM, SIP, BIOS, HPA)
`check_ant_signatures`	match to NSA-ANT-class persistence preconditions + defenses
`attest_firmware`	HMAC-signed attestation, verifiable at `proofof.ai/api/verify`
`gate_inference`	ALLOW/BLOCK AI on this host (strict by default)
`list_threat_model`	the attack surface this defends against

Honest by design

Reports indicators (preconditions implants rely on), never "clean". A BLOCK means "lacks confirmed trust anchors," not "hacked." Harden per the listed defenses, then re-gate.

pip install firmware-attestation-mcp

Configuration

Add to your claude_desktop_config.json (Claude Desktop) or your MCP client config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "firmware-attestation-mcp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["firmware-attestation-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Or: pip install firmware-attestation-mcp then run the firmware-attestation-mcp command (stdio transport).

Examples

Once configured, ask your assistant, for example:

"Use scan_firmware to …"
"Use check_ant_signatures to …"
"Use attest_firmware to …"

Part of the MEOK constellation

This MCP is one node in a connected ecosystem built by MEOK AI LABS around a single sovereign AI core — governed agents with a hash-chained audit trail, mapped to the CSOAI compliance charter.

🌐 The whole map: <https://meok.ai/constellation>
🛡️ AI governance & certification: <https://councilof.ai> · <https://csoai.org>
✅ Verify any signed report: <https://meok.ai/verify>

Firmware Attestation Mcp— agent skill

Is Firmware Attestation Mcp safe to install?

Firmware Attestation MCP

Tools

Honest by design

Configuration

Examples

Part of the MEOK constellation

Audit the pieces. Scan the whole. Decide.