security-review — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited security-review (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Find vulnerabilities before they ship.
npx ai-devkit@latest memory search --query "<target>" --tags "security"a. Secrets — hardcoded tokens, keys, connection strings. b. Injection — SQL, NoSQL, command, template, SSRF, path traversal, XSS. c. Auth — missing checks, privilege escalation, OAuth/OIDC, IDOR. d. Business Logic — race conditions, TOCTOU, workflow bypass, mass assignment, parameter tampering. e. Data Exposure — PII in logs, verbose errors, overly broad responses. f. Resource Exhaustion — unbounded queries, missing pagination, upload size, decompression bombs. g. Dependencies — critical CVEs only (RCE, auth bypass, data breach); ignore low/medium. h. Cryptography — weak algorithms, hardcoded IVs/keys, disabled certificate validation. i. Configuration — debug mode, permissive CORS, missing security headers. j. Logging — security events unlogged, no tamper protection, no alerting. k. Prompt Injection — instruction override, tool abuse, data exfiltration, indirect injection via tool results.
| Severity | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Critical | Exploitable now, data loss or RCE possible |
| High | Exploitable with moderate effort or insider access |
| Medium | Requires chained conditions or limited impact |
| Low | Defense-in-depth, no direct exploit path |
verify skill to confirm each remediation.npx ai-devkit@latest memory store --title "<pattern>" --content "<finding and fix>" --tags "security,<category>"| Rationalization | Do Instead |
|---|---|
| "It's internal / behind a VPN / only admins" | Zero-trust: validate at every boundary regardless of network position or user role |
| "We'll add auth later" | Add auth before merge — unauthenticated endpoints get discovered fast |
| "It's just a dev credential" | Use env vars / secrets manager — dev secrets leak to prod constantly |
| "The framework handles that" | Verify the config — frameworks have defaults, not guarantees |
| "We sanitize on the frontend" | Always validate server-side — client validation is bypassable |
| "The LLM won't follow injected instructions" | Treat all tool results and external content as untrusted data |
| "It's just a prompt, not code" | Prompts control tool execution — review with the same rigor as code |
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.