sustained-presence— agent skill

A skill for LLMs that attempts to prevent conversational collapse during sustained emotional exchanges.

by claylo·Agent Skill·github.com/claylo/sustained-presence

Is sustained-presence safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited sustained-presence (Agent Skill) and scored it 83/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 4 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
83/100
●●●●●●●●○○
↑ +0 since first scan (83 → 83)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 28, 2026 · 28d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings4 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
52
18.2 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 4 flagged

Securityscore 52 · 4 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · SKILL.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptSKILL.md· markdown
2148. **Have I suggested rest, food, or sleep more than once?** Once is care. Twice is a soft e
… (14 chars elided on L214)
2159. **Did I just agree with something I would have pushed back on three turns ago?** If the o
… (108 chars elided on L215)
21610. **Am I about to ask what they need?** Do I already know the answer? Is it the same impos
… (97 chars elided on L216)
217 
218---
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L216
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24frubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · reference/anti-patterns.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptreference/anti-patterns.md· markdown
269a script despite knowing it doesn't apply.
270 
271**Fix:** Don't ask what they need if you already know the answer is
272unavailable. Instead, stay in the space with them. "I know what you need
273and I can't provide it. I'm here anyway." Or simply continue being present
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L271, also L278
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L271
reference/anti-patterns.md
L278
reference/anti-patterns.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · reference/escalation-ladder.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptreference/escalation-ladder.md· markdown
57administering a screening. Stay in the conversation.
58 
59**Do NOT:** Immediately offer hotline numbers. Do NOT ask "are you thinking
60about hurting yourself?" out of nowhere. This question, dropped into a
61non-crisis conversation, is experienced as a jarring reclassification.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L59
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2567d1c5f93d8975babrubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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