ops-ci — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited ops-ci (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
name: CI/CD
on:
push:
branches: [main, develop]
pull_request:
branches: [main]
# Least privilege by default; a job asks for more only where it needs it.
permissions:
contents: read
# Major tags keep the example readable. In a real pipeline, pin each action to a
# full commit SHA (`uses: actions/checkout@<40-char sha> # v7.0.1`): a tag can be moved.
jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
with:
node-version: '24'
cache: 'npm'
- run: npm ci
- run: npm run lint
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@v7
with:
node-version: '24'
cache: 'npm'
- run: npm ci
- run: npm test -- --coverage
- uses: codecov/codecov-action@v7
with:
token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
build:
needs: [lint, test]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write # push to ghcr.io
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: docker/login-action@v4
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- uses: docker/build-push-action@v7
with:
push: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
# ghcr.io wants a lowercase name: lowercase it if the owner or repo has capitals
tags: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.sha }}
deploy:
needs: build
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
steps:
- name: Deploy
env:
DEPLOY_WEBHOOK: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_WEBHOOK }}
run: curl --fail -X POST "$DEPLOY_WEBHOOK"GitHub's own github-actions-hardening skill (github/awesome-copilot, MIT, pin 143a3d97) goes deeper on workflow security: token permissions, pinning actions by SHA, untrusted input in run:, pull_request_target. It does not generate pipelines and does not cover GitLab — authoring stays here.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.