implement-batch— agent skill

implement-batch — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by chrisallenlane·Agent Skill·github.com/chrisallenlane/claude-swe-workflows

Is implement-batch safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited implement-batch (Agent Skill) and scored it 87/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 3 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
87/100
●●●●●●●●●
↑ +0 since first scan (87 → 87)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 29d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings3 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
64
22.4 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 3 flagged

Securityscore 64 · 3 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · skills/implement-batch/SKILL.md×2
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptskills/implement-batch/SKILL.md· markdown
120| `/implement` Step | Autonomous Override
121|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------
… (108 chars elided on L121)
122| **Step 1** (requirements) | Pre-loaded from ticket body. Do not prompt u
… (108 chars elided on L122)
123| **Step 2** (planning) | Follow normal conditional logic — invoke `sw
… (51 chars elided on L123)
124| **Steps 3-4** (implementation + acceptance) | Follow normal logic. If acceptance verificat
… (107 chars elided on L124)
Occurrences
2 occurrences · first at L122, also L129
Show all 2 locations
Line
File
L122
skills/implement-batch/SKILL.md
L129
skills/implement-batch/SKILL.md
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2568169c469ab5917e7rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · CHANGELOG.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptCHANGELOG.md· markdown
151- **Altitude rule** — no andon-cord pulls below architectural / intent level; implementation
… (89 chars elided on L151)
152- **Cascade rule** — when a sub-skill escalates, the parent decides whether the escalation i
… (71 chars elided on L152)
153- **Pre-loaded options with tradeoffs** — when escalation does happen, always present 2–3 na
… (104 chars elided on L153)
154- **Pre-rebutted recommendation** — the skill argues against its own pick before presenting.
155- **Risk-budgeted autonomy** — explicit budgets (refactor scope, file count, dep changes) th
… (33 chars elided on L155)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L153
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha2565084aa178cfd9d97rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Vendor response · right of reply
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