chdb-mcp

An MCP server for chDB, the in-process SQL OLAP engine powered by ClickHouse. Lets agents (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Codex CLI, Cline, …) query Parquet, CSV, JSON, and pandas DataFrames with one tool — no separate server, no Docker.

Why chdb-mcp?

• Full ClickHouse engine, in-process. 1000+ functions (windowFunnel, quantilesTDigest, geoToH3, the -If/-State/-Merge combinators), typed JSON with O(1) sub-column reads, native vectors, MergeTree storage.
• Drop-in pandas API. import datastore as pd covers ~300 pandas-shaped methods compiled to ClickHouse SQL. v1.0 adds dataframe_query() for zero-copy Python(df).
• ~80 formats and 12+ source connectors in core. Parquet, CSV, JSON, Avro, ORC, Arrow, Protobuf, plus s3(), mongodb(), postgresql(), mysql(), iceberg(), deltaLake() — no INSTALL/LOAD chain.
• Federate to remote ClickHouse in one statement. (v0.5) remoteSecure('cluster:9440', 'db.table', ...) joins local Parquet with a production ClickHouse cluster in one optimised plan.
• Same SQL as your warehouse. Copy-paste ClickHouse production queries into the agent prompt — no dialect bridge.

Install

pip install chdb-mcp

Connect

Claude Desktop — add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{ "mcpServers": { "chdb": { "command": "chdb-mcp" } } }

Cursor / VS Code — same JSON in ~/.cursor/mcp.json etc.; one-click badges land in v0.2.

Codex CLI / Claude Code / Copilot / Droid — use the cross-IDE bundle chdb-agent-plugin.

Tools (v0.1)

Read-only by default — SET readonly=2 blocks INSERT/CREATE/DROP/ALTER while keeping file()/url()/s3() usable. Set CHDB_MCP_WRITE=1 to drop the guard. See Security model.

In query_file, {file} is replaced with file('path', 'format') before execution:

query_file(
    path="/data/sales.parquet",
    sql="SELECT region, sum(revenue) FROM {file} GROUP BY region",
    format="Parquet",
)

Configuration

Security model

chDB is in-process. There is no privilege boundary between the MCP server and the host Python interpreter, so the server can't make stronger isolation guarantees than the host already gives it. The model below reflects that.

Trust tiers

1. Default (no `CHDB_MCP_FILE_ALLOWLIST`) — no filesystem gating. query() and query_file() can reach anything the host process can reach (any file(), url(), s3(), remote()...). Appropriate when the agent is trusted, or when the surrounding host application enforces the security boundary itself.
2. Opt-in allowlist (`CHDB_MCP_FILE_ALLOWLIST=/data:/tmp/foo`) — best-effort defense in depth:

• query_file() rejects paths whose resolved (symlink-followed) form isn't under any listed prefix.
• Both query() and query_file() reject SQL containing any table function that isn't on the safe-by-construction list (numbers/values/view/merge/dictionary/generateRandom/...). The "known" set is snapshotted from system.table_functions at session start, so the gate stays in sync with whatever the running chDB build actually exposes — including new external-source variants (paimon*, prometheusQuery*, iceberg*Azure/S3/HDFS), RCE-class functions (executable, python), and *Cluster siblings, without a hand-maintained denylist that goes stale.
• For query_file(), the scan runs on the user SQL before the {file} placeholder substitution, so a UNION ALL SELECT … FROM file('/etc/passwd', …) smuggled into the query body is caught even though the explicit path is gated.
• The scanner is comment- and string-aware (single-pass mask covering line comments, block comments, single-quoted strings with '' / \' / \\ escapes), and it normalizes backtick- and double-quote-wrapped identifiers (` file / "file"`) before matching so quoted function names can't bypass it.
• This is not a sandbox: a determined caller can still try to exfiltrate via undiscovered functions, settings, or future chDB features. Strong enough for casual agent mistakes, not for adversarial input.

1. Hard isolation — for adversarial input, wrap the server in OS-level confinement: macOS App Sandbox, Linux user namespaces / seccomp, or Docker with a read-only filesystem mount. Nothing at the MCP layer can substitute for this.

What's protected

• Accidental writes — SET readonly=2 is applied at session start. CHDB_MCP_WRITE=1 lifts it. (Note: ClickHouse's readonly=2 still permits TEMPORARY TABLE writes and runtime SET changes — by design, not a bug.)
• Runaway result sizes — CHDB_MCP_MAX_RESULT_BYTES is enforced engine-side (max_block_size + max_result_bytes + result_overflow_mode='break'), not just as a post-hoc string slice. Large queries no longer materialize multi-MiB in chDB before truncation.
• Runaway wall-clock — CHDB_MCP_QUERY_TIMEOUT_SEC (default 30s) caps each query via chDB's max_execution_time.
• SQL-identifier injection — list_tables / describe_table / get_sample_data arguments are whitelist-regex'd ([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]* only) and backtick-quoted before interpolation.
• SQL string-literal escape — list_functions(pattern) and query_file(path, format) arguments are passed through quote_string, which escapes both single quotes (' → '') and backslashes (\ → \\) so that ClickHouse's \' escape form cannot break out of the literal.

What's NOT protected

• SQL audit. Only the readonly guard — no allow/deny list of statements. Treat the agent as having full SELECT access to anything chDB can reach (subject to the allowlist when set).
• Setting tampering. Under readonly=2, the agent can still SET max_memory_usage = … to raise resource caps. Lock this down at the host or via OS-level resource limits if it matters.
• Memory / CPU caps. chDB's max_memory_usage applies, but there's no ulimit/cgroups equivalent imposed by the MCP layer.

For agents acting on untrusted input, run in a throwaway container.

Roadmap

• v0.5 — query_remote_clickhouse() federation tool
• v1.0 — attach_file(), dataframe_query() (zero-copy Python(df)), HTTP/SSE transport with Bearer auth, .mcpb bundle for Claude Desktop one-click install

Troubleshooting

macOS: "Server disconnected" in Claude Desktop

If ~/Library/Logs/Claude/mcp-server-chdb.log shows PermissionError: Operation not permitted on pyvenv.cfg, your venv sits under a TCC-protected directory (~/Downloads, ~/Documents, ~/Desktop) — Claude Desktop subprocesses can't read those paths.

Fix: install elsewhere. Recommended is uvx (zero-config, isolated under ~/.local/share/uv/):

{ "mcpServers": { "chdb": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["chdb-mcp"] } } }

Or build a venv yourself under ~/.local/share/chdb-mcp/.venv and point Claude Desktop at its chdb-mcp binary.

query_file returns "path is not under any prefix"

The allowlist resolves symlinks on both sides (so /tmp matches /private/tmp on macOS). If you still hit this, check the resolved form printed in the error against python -c "from pathlib import Path; print(Path('YOUR_PATH').resolve())".

"Cannot execute query in readonly mode"

SET readonly=2 blocks DDL/DML by design. Rewrite as a pure SELECT, or restart with CHDB_MCP_WRITE=1.

Per-server logs

~/Library/Logs/Claude/mcp-server-chdb.log   # startup diagnostics + stderr
~/Library/Logs/Claude/mcp.log                # all servers' JSON-RPC traffic

Development

git clone https://github.com/chdb-io/chdb-mcp && cd chdb-mcp
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest && ruff check src tests

License

Apache 2.0 — see LICENSE.