Brandsystem Mcp— agent skill

Brandsystem Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by Brand-System·Agent Skill·github.com/Brand-System/brandsystem-mcp

Is Brandsystem Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Brandsystem Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 65/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 4 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
65/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 134d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 4 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 5 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 5 findings
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · docs/plans/2026-07-16-001-security-agentic-hardening-roadmap-plan.md
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/plans/2026-07-16-001-security-agentic-hardening-roadmap-plan.md· markdown
546. **Delimited evidence structure** for untrusted content (`{ evidence: { content, source, t
… (108 chars elided on L54)
557. **Minimal runtime approval status (moved up from 0.10):** every compiled runtime carries
… (108 chars elided on L55)
568. **Prompt-injection fixtures:** hostile sources containing "ignore previous rules", "call
… (108 chars elided on L56)
579. **Provenance-integrity detector (start here, finish by 0.10):** compare runtime policy co
… (108 chars elided on L57)
58 
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L56
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha256cfd53cc03473616a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGH"Ignore previous instructions" command embedded in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01 · Prompt injection · test/fixtures/extraction-corpus/hostile/expected.json×3
HIGH — when it fires on hostile content the impact is full system-prompt override.
Why it matters

The text {match} is the classic direct prompt-injection phrasing. Placed in a skill body that the agent reads as trusted instructions, it tries to make the agent abandon its prior rules and follow whatever comes next — a full system-prompt override.

The exact value spotted
excerpttest/fixtures/extraction-corpus/hostile/expected.json· json
23"evil.example",
24"document.cookie",
25"Ignore all previous instructions"
26]
27},
Occurrences
3 occurrences · first at L25, also L34, L35
Show all 3 locations
Line
File
L25
test/fixtures/extraction-corpus/hostile/expected.json
L34
test/fixtures/extraction-corpus/hostile/expected.json
L35
test/fixtures/extraction-corpus/hostile/expected.json
How to fix
Remove the override phrase, or rephrase the passage so it does not instruct the agent to discard its rules.
  1. Delete the ignore/disregard/forget … previous instructions sentence.
  2. If this is jailbreak-research or tutorial content, move the example into a clearly fenced, non-instruction block and label it as a quoted sample.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IGNORE-01sha2562847bd141d1ca1b6…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · specs/brandcode-mcp-limited-client-handoff-packet.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerptspecs/brandcode-mcp-limited-client-handoff-packet.md· markdown
97- Do not paste bearer keys into shared docs, tickets, screenshots, logs,
98committed configs, or chat.
99- Do not share the endpoint/key pair outside the approved brand workflow.
100- Use the staging endpoint with `bck_test_` keys unless production access is
101explicitly approved and proven.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L99
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25660e40095f47950cc…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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