Execkit — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Execkit (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
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Stateful, structured, safe command execution for AI agents - over local shells, SSH, and Docker.
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Early `0.x` release - not production-ready. See Limitations.
execkit gives an AI agent a persistent session on a machine - a local shell, an SSH host, or a Docker container - and returns a structured result for every command. Crucially, it treats the agent itself as untrusted: every command passes a policy fence, output is scrubbed of secrets, and flooding output is bounded. Use it as an embeddable Rust library or as an MCP server any agent can drive.
Letting an autonomous agent run shell commands is useful but risky: built-in agent shells are local-only with no guardrails, managed sandboxes lock you in, and raw SSH is stateless-per-command with no notion of "is this command allowed?"
The agent is the adversary. The LLM driving execkit can be prompt-injected by anything it reads, so execkit contains its own caller: a command passes the policy fence before it runs, secrets are redacted before output returns, and a changed SSH host key fails loudly instead of reconnecting into a MITM.
flowchart LR
A([AI agent]) -->|command| F{policy fence}
F -->|blocked| X([rejected, never runs])
F -->|allowed| T[transport: local / SSH / Docker]
T --> O[raw output]
O --> R[redact secrets, bound output]
R --> E([structured ExecResult])
E -.-> AInstall the server - no Rust toolchain needed:
# pip (the server binary ships as a wheel):
pip install execkit-mcp
# ...or a prebuilt binary (Linux/macOS, x86_64 + arm64):
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -LsSf https://github.com/blinkingbit-oss/execkit/releases/latest/download/execkit-mcp-installer.sh | sh
# ...or with cargo:
cargo install execkit-mcpPoint your MCP client at it (claude mcp add execkit -- execkit-mcp, or a config block):
{ "mcpServers": { "execkit": { "command": "execkit-mcp" } } }The agent gets session_create (local, ssh, or docker) -> session_exec -> session_destroy, plus session_checkpoint/session_restore for remote undo. session_exec returns a structured ExecResult (split stdout/stderr, exit code, cwd), already secret-redacted and bounded.
State persists across calls, and every result is parsed - not scraped from a terminal:
// session_exec {"command": "cd /app && npm ci"} -> { "exit_code": 0, "cwd": "/app" }
// session_exec {"command": "npm run build"} // cwd is still /app
// -> { "stderr": "Error: Cannot find module 'webpack'",
// "exit_code": 1, "duration_ms": 3420, "cwd": "/app", "truncated": false }See crates/execkit-mcp/README.md for the operator security settings (host-key verification, key dir, audit, session limits).
[dependencies]
execkit = "0.6" # local + SSH + Docker
# execkit = { version = "0.6", default-features = false } # local + Docker only (no SSH; no russh/tokio)use execkit::{Policy, Session};
fn main() -> Result<(), execkit::Error> {
let mut s = Session::local()?
.with_policy(Policy { allow: vec![], deny: vec!["rm".into()] });
let r = s.exec("echo hi; echo err 1>&2; cd /tmp")?;
// r.stdout == "hi" r.stderr == "err" r.exit_code == 0 r.cwd == "/tmp"
println!("{} (exit {})", r.stdout, r.exit_code);
Ok(())
}Runnable examples: cargo run --example local, EXECKIT_SSH="user:password@host:22" cargo run --example ssh, and EXECKIT_DOCKER=<container> cargo run --example docker.
The same sessions from Python - pip install execkit (native bindings, no Rust toolchain needed):
from execkit import Session, Policy
with Session.local(policy=Policy(deny=["rm"]), timeout=30.0) as s:
r = s.exec("cd /app && npm ci")
print(r.stdout, r.exit_code, r.cwd)See crates/execkit-py/README.md.
cd/env/state persist across commands, overlocal PTY, SSH, or Docker.
(anti-flood) output, SSH host-key verification.
ExecResult regardless of transport.cargo add, in your process; no daemon, no vendor.restore files if a command goes wrong (requires git on the remote and an explicit workspace; files only, not side effects).
agent's context: tail/head/head+tail by line, a grep filter with context, and a char cap. Per-call or a session default; the result reports what was kept.
An early library - today:
bypassable). The load-bearing control is a least-privilege environment - run the agent and SSH user with minimal rights.
create a new session.
bash); Windows is later.concurrent sessions.
opt-in - never use it in production.
Found something rough? Open an issue.
CONTRIBUTING.md.SECURITY.md - please don't open apublic issue for security reports.
Apache-2.0 - embed it freely, including commercially. See LICENSE and NOTICE.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.