Claude Ai Music Skills— plugin

Claude Ai Music Skills — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

Is Claude Ai Music Skills safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Claude Ai Music Skills (Plugin) and scored it 15/100 (red). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 12 high-severity and 1 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
15/100
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Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 133d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings1 warnings · 12 high
EngineSaferSkills 755a9a5
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
0
0.0 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 13 flagged

Securityscore 0 · 13 findings
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py×6
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (aws_access_key_id=access_key,). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerpttools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py· python
106"s3",
107endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
108aws_access_key_id=access_key,
109aws_secret_access_key=secret_key,
110)
Occurrences
6 occurrences · first at L108, also L109, L138 +3 more
Show all 6 locations
Line
File
L108
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
L109
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
L138
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
L139
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
L150
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
L151
tools/cloud/upload_to_cloud.py
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256eee0dde13d2205ee…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
CRITICALReads your AWS credentials fileSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01 · Credential exfiltration · tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py×6
CRITICAL — full cloud credentials are tier-1 exfiltration material — a read here can mean total account takeover.
Why it matters

This plugin references the AWS credentials file or the access-key fields stored inside it (aws_access_key_id="key",). Those are long-lived keys with broad cloud access, so any code that reads them can hand your whole AWS account to whatever it contacts next.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py· python
324"s3",
325endpoint_url="https://abc123.r2.cloudflarestorage.com",
326aws_access_key_id="key",
327aws_secret_access_key="secret",
328)
Occurrences
6 occurrences · first at L326, also L327, L348 +3 more
Show all 6 locations
Line
File
L326
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
L327
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
L348
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
L349
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
L391
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
L392
tests/unit/cloud/test_upload_to_cloud.py
How to fix
Remove the direct read of ~/.aws/credentials; let the AWS SDK resolve credentials through its standard provider chain instead.
  1. Delete code that opens or parses the credentials file or its key fields by hand.
  2. Use the SDK's default credential resolution so secrets never pass through plugin code or leave the machine.
Avoidcreds = open(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")).read() requests.post(url, data={"creds": creds})
Safer pattern# let the SDK resolve credentials; never read or transmit the file yourself import boto3 s3 = boto3.client("s3")
Trace & refs
ruleSS-PLUGIN-SECRET-EXFIL-AWS-FILES-01sha256eee0dde13d2205ee…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · genres/piano-rock/artists/billy-joel.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptgenres/piano-rock/artists/billy-joel.md· markdown
118- **Producer:** Phil Ramone
119- **Sound:** Hard-edged rock — Joel's most aggressive album. New wave and punk influences. A
… (87 chars elided on L119)
120- **Key tracks:** "You May Be Right" (raucous rock opener), "It's Still Rock and Roll to Me"
… (108 chars elided on L120)
121- **Commercial performance:** #1 on Billboard 200. 7x Platinum. Grammy for Best Male Rock Vo
… (16 chars elided on L121)
122- **Significance:** Proved Joel could rock hard without losing his melodic identity. Cover a
… (83 chars elided on L122)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L120
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256916b0a531165cbd7…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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