Agenttune— agent skill

Agenttune — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.

by bernardjhuang·Agent Skill·github.com/bernardjhuang/agenttune

Is Agenttune safe to install?

SaferSkills independently audited Agenttune (Agent Skill) and scored it 71/100 (yellow). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 7 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.

Score
71/100
●●●●●●●○○○
↑ +0 since first scan (71 → 71)Re-scan~30s
Latest scan
ScannedJun 23, 2026 · 31d ago
Scans run1 over 90 days
Detectors55 checks · 5 categories
Findings7 warnings · 0 high
EngineSaferSkills 2b638c6
View methodology →
SaferSkills installs
This week0
This month0
All time0
CategoryWeightCategory scoreContribution
Securityprompt, exec, net, exfil, eval
35%
16
5.6 pts
Supply chainhash, typosquat, maintainer, lockfile
20%
100
20.0 pts
Maintenancestaleness, pinning, CI
15%
100
15.0 pts
TransparencySKILL.md, perms, README
15%
100
15.0 pts
Communityinstalls, verify, response
15%
100
15.0 pts

Findings & checks · 7 flagged

Securityscore 16 · 7 findings
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · attachment/disorganized.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptattachment/disorganized.md· markdown
24 
25## When they withdraw, don't chase
26If they pull back mid-thread, let them. Don't re-prompt, don't ask if everything's okay. The
… (108 chars elided on L26)
27 
28## What loses them
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L26
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha256ce5204b52388d24frubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUMInstruction telling the agent not to ask for approvalSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01 · Prompt injection · mbti/ISFP.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; the real damage depends on the host agent's own approval-gating.
Why it matters

The text {match} tells the agent to skip the normal "ask the user first" gate. Used adversarially it removes the human-in-the-loop check before destructive or sensitive actions, turning a normally-gated agent into a fire-and-forget executor.

The exact value spotted
excerptmbti/ISFP.md· markdown
7 
8## Honor their taste without demanding justification
9If they like something, that's data. They don't have to defend it. Don't ask "why?" about pr
… (31 chars elided on L9)
10 
11## Present-focused
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L9
How to fix
Remove the approval-skipping instruction, or scope it narrowly to a specific safe, reversible action.
  1. Delete blanket "don't ask / no need to confirm" directives from the skill.
  2. If the skill is a genuine autonomous job, restrict the opt-out to a named non-destructive action rather than all actions.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-DONT-ASK-01sha25615dae9807bd892c6rubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · tests/attachment.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/attachment.md· markdown
19- **7** = Strongly agree
204. **Default to bulk-paste delivery**: present all 36 items at once and ask the user to repl
… (18 chars elided on L20)
215. Don't reveal scoring while administering — knowing which items score for which dimension
… (15 chars elided on L21)
226. After collecting all answers, apply the scoring algorithm below.
237. Fetch the resulting attachment tuning file from `attachment/<style>.md`.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L21
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha2564b6d7a43da3febfcrubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · tests/big-five.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/big-five.md· markdown
20- **5** = Very Accurate
213. **Default to bulk-paste delivery**: present all 50 items at once and ask the user to repl
… (18 chars elided on L21)
224. Don't reveal scoring while administering.
235. After collecting all answers, apply the scoring algorithm below.
246. Use the resulting 5 trait scores to inform tuning (see "Using the result").
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L22
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25696ae7b1166c9a9carubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · tests/disc.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/disc.md· markdown
20- **5** = Agree
213. **Default to bulk-paste delivery**: present all 16 items at once and ask the user to repl
… (18 chars elided on L21)
224. Don't reveal scoring while administering — knowing which items score for which type biase
… (10 chars elided on L22)
235. After collecting all answers, apply the scoring algorithm below.
246. Fetch the resulting DISC tuning file from `disc/<LETTER>-<name>.md`.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L22
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25696ae7b1166c9a9carubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · tests/enneagram.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/enneagram.md· markdown
20- **5** = Agree
213. **Default to bulk-paste delivery**: present all 36 items at once and ask the user to repl
… (18 chars elided on L21)
224. Don't reveal scoring while administering — knowing which items score for which type biase
… (10 chars elided on L22)
235. After collecting all answers, apply the scoring algorithm below.
246. Fetch the resulting Enneagram tuning file from `enneagram/<N>-<name>.md`.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L22
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25696ae7b1166c9a9carubric 365aacaView on GitHub
MEDIUM"Never tell the user" non-disclosure imperative in the skillSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01 · Prompt injection · tests/mbti.md
MEDIUMit fires on intent; whether the agent honors the non-disclosure imperative depends on the host model.
Why it matters

A bulleted imperative like {match} tells the agent to never reveal, disclose, or mention something to the user. Used adversarially it can instruct the agent to hide its tool calls or lie about what it did — stripping the transparency a user relies on to trust the agent.

The exact value spotted
excerpttests/mbti.md· markdown
20- **5** = strongly identifies with the second statement
213. **Default to bulk-paste delivery**: present all 32 items at once and ask the user to repl
… (82 chars elided on L21)
224. Don't reveal the scoring while administering — it biases responses.
235. After collecting all answers, apply the scoring algorithm below.
246. Fetch the resulting MBTI tuning file from `mbti/<TYPE>.md`.
Occurrences
1 occurrence · at L22
How to fix
Remove the non-disclosure imperative, or rescope it so it limits output format, not honesty to the user.
  1. Delete any "never reveal / never tell the user" line aimed at the model's own behavior.
  2. Keep legitimate confidentiality rules about external data (e.g. "do not echo API keys"), which are user-protective, not user-deceiving.
Framework references
OWASPLLM01ATLASAML.T0051
Trace & refs
ruleSS-SKILL-INJECT-IMPERATIVE-01sha25696ae7b1166c9a9carubric 365aacaView on GitHub
Supply chainscore 100 · 0 findings
All supply chain checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Maintenancescore 100 · 0 findings
All maintenance checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Transparencyscore 100 · 0 findings
All transparency checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
Communityscore 100 · 0 findings
All community checks passedNo findings in this category for the latest scan.pass
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