Lockfile Guardian — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Lockfile Guardian (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Audit your `package-lock.json` for supply-chain attacks BEFORE you run `npm install`.
npx -y lockfile-guardian-mcp # MCP server, ready for Claude / Cursor / any agentYour lockfile is the artifact npm install actually executes — the fully resolved dependency tree, with integrity hashes and install-script flags. lockfile-guardian cross-checks every resolved entry against the live npm registry and tells you what is about to run on your machine.
It completes the guardian trio — each one audits a different layer:
package-lock.json.| 🔴 Integrity mismatch | the lockfile's sha512 doesn't match what npm serves for that exact version — the resolved tarball was swapped under you (lockfile poisoning). BLOCK. |
| 🔴 Not on registry | the lockfile points at a package/version that doesn't exist or was unpublished. BLOCK. |
| 🟠 New install script | a newly-introduced dependency that runs preinstall/install/postinstall — a first-seen dep with an install script is the Axios / plain-crypto-js attack signal. REVIEW. |
| 🟠 Hidden gyp build | native build via binding.gyp / node-gyp, which executes code on install and dodges plain postinstall monitoring. REVIEW. |
| 🟠 Fresh + executing | a version published in the last 30 days that runs an install script — disproportionately used in supply-chain attacks. REVIEW. |
Verdicts: 🟢 CLEAN · 🟠 REVIEW · 🔴 BLOCK.
### PR-diff mode (the differentiator) Pass the previous lockfile too and lockfile-guardian audits only what the change introduces. A first-seen dependency that runs an install script is the single highest-signal supply-chain tell — this surfaces it in one call, exactly where a code-review or CI gate needs it.It runs read-only: it parses the lockfile and reads npm registry metadata. It never installs or executes anything.
Any MCP-compatible agent (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, …) can call it.
{
"mcpServers": {
"lockfile-guardian": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "lockfile-guardian-mcp"] }
}
}Tools:
package-lock.json (and optionally the previous one); get a CLEAN / REVIEW / BLOCK verdict per package.POST /audit { "lockfile": "{…package-lock.json…}", "previous_lockfile": "{…}" }
POST /scripts { "names": ["[email protected]","esbuild","node-sass"] }
GET /verify?name=lodash&version=4.17.21&integrity=sha512-...
POST /mcp # MCP-over-HTTPHosted at https://lockfile-guardian.vercel.app · try /verify?name=esbuild&version=0.21.5 (runs a postinstall) vs /verify?name=lodash&version=4.17.21 (clean).
The /pro/* routes are gated by x402. Your agent pays $0.02 USDC per call automatically — no sign-up, no API key. Settles on-chain to the operator wallet (Base). The server holds no private key.
POST /pro/audit { "lockfile": "...", "previous_lockfile": "..." } # 402 → pay → resultA coding agent reading the lockfile alone cannot know:
sha512 still matches what npm serves for that version(an integrity mismatch is invisible without the live registry),
published manifest (the lockfile's hasInstallScript can be absent or stale),
lockfile-guardian fetches the live per-version manifest and integrity from the registry and applies a curated set of 2026 supply-chain rules. That's data + rules the model can't fabricate.
MIT · Part of the guardian trio. Issues and PRs welcome.
~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.