Oauth Auth0 Mcp Prototype — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited Oauth Auth0 Mcp Prototype (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
This folder is isolated from the plugin workspace so the OAuth/Auth0 test can be run on its own.
For the full narrative, mistakes, and final working flow, see AUTH0_PROTOTYPE_RUNBOOK.md.
Le passage le plus important que je veux m’assurer qu’il fonctionne, c’est la chaîne d’identité de bout en bout : Auth0 émet un access token valide, Alpic le transmet à mon serveur MCP, le backend valide le JWT, et je peux mapper de façon fiable org_id vers cabinet_id.
Pour m’en assurer, je suis passé par un prototype minimal au lieu de brancher Turso tout de suite. Ça m’a permis d’isoler la couche identité et transport du reste de l’application.
Pour tester ça, je n’ai exposé que la surface la plus simple utile :
GET /health pour le contrôle publicGET /whoami pour le contrôle HTTP protégéPOST /mcp avec un seul outil whoami() pour le contrôle MCP protégéComme ça, je peux prouver que le chemin d’authentification fonctionne avant d’ajouter la persistance ou la logique métier.
pyproject.toml, ce qui a cassé le build Python avec No pyproject.toml found.uv.lock, alors qu’Alpic lance le build Python en mode figé avec UV_FROZEN=1.main.py, alors qu’Alpic essayait de démarrer le serveur avec ce point d’entrée.8000 au lieu de lire le port fourni par l’environnement Alpic, ce qui peut empêcher la connexion même si le déploiement est marqué comme réussi.GET /healthGET /whoamiPOST /mcpSet these variables in Alpic:
AUTH0_DOMAIN=dev-v4m6lbgizxmu1vhc.us.auth0.comAUTH0_AUDIENCE=<your Auth0 API identifier>ENV=productionOptional but useful:
AUTH0_ISSUER=https://dev-v4m6lbgizxmu1vhc.us.auth0.com/AUTH0_JWKS_URL=https://dev-v4m6lbgizxmu1vhc.us.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.jsonCABINET_ID_BY_ORG_JSON={"org_123":"cabinet-a"}DEFAULT_CABINET_ID=cabinet-aCORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=http://127.0.0.1:3000PUBLIC_BASE_URL=https://your-alpic-deployment-urlFor local tests, AUTH0_JWKS_JSON can hold a JWKS document directly.
The server now exposes OAuth discovery metadata at:
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/.well-known/oauth-authorization-serverFor Alpic DCR proxy discovery, the metadata self-references the deployed MCP public URL as its issuer while still pointing authorization and token endpoints to Auth0.
Backend:
python server.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000Local Auth0 token helper:
python client_server.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000Then open http://127.0.0.1:3000/, sign in, and copy the access token.
If the project is installed as a package, the console script is:
oauth-auth0-mcp-prototypeAlpic can also start the repository entrypoint directly from main.py.
In the Auth0 SPA application, set:
http://127.0.0.1:3000/callbackhttp://127.0.0.1:3000/http://127.0.0.1:3000http://127.0.0.1:3000If you want the page button to call the backend directly, start the backend with:
$env:CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS="http://127.0.0.1:3000"
python server.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000python -m unittest discover -s tests/health works without auth/whoami rejects missing tokens/whoami accepts a valid Auth0 RS256 access tokenorg_id is extracted from the tokencabinet_id is resolved from the organization metadatawhoami() tool returns the same identity payload~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.