auditing-kubernetes-rbac-permissions — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited auditing-kubernetes-rbac-permissions (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) auditing systematically reviews roles, cluster roles, bindings, and service account permissions to identify overly permissive access, privilege escalation paths, and violations of least-privilege principles. Tools like rbac-tool, KubiScan, and rakkess automate discovery of dangerous permission combinations.
| Resource | Scope | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Role | Namespace | Grants permissions within a namespace |
| ClusterRole | Cluster | Grants permissions cluster-wide |
| RoleBinding | Namespace | Binds Role/ClusterRole to subjects in namespace |
| ClusterRoleBinding | Cluster | Binds ClusterRole to subjects cluster-wide |
| Permission | Risk | Impact |
|---|---|---|
* on * resources | Critical | Equivalent to cluster-admin |
| create pods | High | Can deploy privileged pods |
| create pods/exec | High | Can exec into any pod |
| get secrets | High | Can read all secrets |
| create clusterrolebindings | Critical | Can escalate to cluster-admin |
| impersonate users | Critical | Can act as any user |
| escalate on roles | Critical | Can grant permissions beyond own |
| bind on roles | High | Can create new role bindings |
# List all ClusterRoles
kubectl get clusterroles -o name | wc -l
kubectl get clusterroles --no-headers | grep -v "system:"
# List all ClusterRoleBindings
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o wide
# List all Roles per namespace
kubectl get roles -A
# List all RoleBindings per namespace
kubectl get rolebindings -A -o wide
# Export all RBAC for offline analysis
kubectl get clusterroles,clusterrolebindings,roles,rolebindings -A -o yaml > rbac-export.yaml# Find ClusterRoles with wildcard verbs on all resources
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.rules[]? |
(.verbs | index("*")) and
(.resources | index("*"))
) |
.metadata.name'
# Find roles that can create pods
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.rules[]? |
(.verbs | index("create") or index("*")) and
(.resources | index("pods") or index("*"))
) |
.metadata.name'
# Find roles that can read secrets
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.rules[]? |
(.verbs | index("get") or index("list") or index("*")) and
(.resources | index("secrets") or index("*"))
) |
.metadata.name'# List all service accounts
kubectl get serviceaccounts -A
# Check permissions for default service accounts
for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}'); do
echo "=== $ns/default ==="
kubectl auth can-i --list --as=system:serviceaccount:$ns:default 2>/dev/null | grep -v "no"
done
# Check for service accounts with cluster-admin
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.roleRef.name == "cluster-admin") |
{binding: .metadata.name, subjects: [.subjects[]? | {kind, name, namespace}]}'# Install rbac-tool
kubectl krew install rbac-tool
# Visualize RBAC
kubectl rbac-tool viz --outformat dot | dot -Tpng > rbac-graph.png
# Find who can perform specific actions
kubectl rbac-tool who-can get secrets -A
kubectl rbac-tool who-can create pods -A
kubectl rbac-tool who-can '*' '*'
# Analyze all permissions
kubectl rbac-tool analysis
# Generate RBAC policy report
kubectl rbac-tool auditgen > rbac-audit.yaml# Check if any role can escalate privileges
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.rules[]? |
(.verbs | index("escalate") or index("bind") or index("impersonate")) and
(.resources | index("clusterroles") or index("roles") or index("clusterrolebindings") or index("rolebindings") or index("users") or index("groups") or index("serviceaccounts"))
) |
.metadata.name'
# Check for impersonation permissions
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r '
.items[] |
select(.rules[]? |
(.verbs | index("impersonate"))
) |
{name: .metadata.name, rules: .rules}'# Install KubiScan
pip install kubiscan
# Find risky roles
kubiscan --risky-roles
# Find risky ClusterRoles
kubiscan --risky-clusterroles
# Find risky subjects
kubiscan --risky-subjects
# Find pods with risky service accounts
kubiscan --risky-pods
# Full report
kubiscan --all# Verify specific permission
kubectl auth can-i create pods --as=system:serviceaccount:default:myapp
# Check all permissions for a user
kubectl auth can-i --list [email protected]
# Validate RBAC with kubescape
kubescape scan framework nsa --controls-config rbac-controls.json
# Test least privilege
kubectl auth can-i delete nodes --as=system:serviceaccount:app:web-server
# Expected: no~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.