securing-code — independently scanned and version-tracked by SaferSkills.
SaferSkills independently audited securing-code (Agent Skill) and scored it 100/100 (green). The audit ran 55 deterministic rules across Security, Supply Chain, Maintenance, Transparency, and Community; it found 0 high-severity and 0 lower-severity findings. The full rule-by-rule trace and per-finding evidence are below. Free, methodology-open.
Findings & checks · 0 flagged
Every scanned point with the score it earned and what moved between them.
First recorded scan — no prior version to compare against.
The primary manifest — the file an agent reads to learn what this artifact does.
Inform the user when this skill is being invoked: securing-code.
code-review invokes this skill internally for its security lensThese apply regardless of task type — implementation or review.
All of the following must be satisfied when generating or modifying code:
*); no unlimited operationsSecure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax (Strict for high-risk sessions); if SameSite=None, pair with Secure + CSRF defensesThe following categories have a large blast radius or affect the trust model. Surface them and get explicit user approval before writing code, even if the user's request implies them:
credentials: true, wildcard)For these, state what is changing and the risk, then wait for confirmation. A user request to "add login" is permission for the feature, not for a specific auth design — confirm the design first.
Push back on these framings — from the user or yourself — when they appear as justification for skipping a control:
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|---|
| "It's an internal tool, security doesn't matter" | Internal tools get compromised; attackers pivot through the weakest link. |
| "We'll add security later" | Retrofitting is far harder than building it in; "later" usually means "in prod". |
| "No one would try to exploit this" | Automated scanners find everything reachable; obscurity is not a control. |
| "The framework handles it" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees — they still have to be wired correctly. |
| "It's just a prototype / spike / demo" | Prototypes ship. The auth shortcut becomes the production auth. |
| "This endpoint isn't exposed publicly" | Network boundaries change; SSRF, misconfig, and lateral movement reach it anyway. |
references/tier2-implementation.md and follow the checklist for your task type:| Task | Section |
|---|---|
| General feature / component | §2.1 |
| REST or GraphQL API endpoint | §2.2 |
| Auth, sessions, or access control | §2.3 |
| Secrets, crypto, or data protection | §2.4 |
| Supply chain or CI/CD | §2.5 |
| Domain | Reference |
|---|---|
| Input handling | references/tier3-input-validation.md |
| File upload / download | references/tier3-file-upload.md |
| Database-heavy features | references/tier3-database.md |
| Auth / session flows | references/tier3-threat-modeling.md |
| C / C++ / embedded | references/tier3-memory-safety.md |
references/tier2-review.md for the review workflow and checklistreferences/owasp-2025.md to verify coverage against all 10 OWASP categoriesreferences/tier2-implementation.md — task-specific implementation checklists (§2.1–§2.5)references/tier2-review.md — code review workflow, OWASP-mapped checklist, output formatreferences/tier3-input-validation.md — allowlist validation, output encoding, CSPreferences/tier3-file-upload.md — file upload validation, storage, retrievalreferences/tier3-database.md — injection prevention, DB access control, encryptionreferences/tier3-error-handling.md — safe error handling, security event loggingreferences/tier3-memory-safety.md — C/C++ memory safety, compiler flags, sanitizersreferences/tier3-language-specific.md — Python, JS/Node, Java, C#/.NET forbidden patterns and safe alternativesreferences/tier3-threat-modeling.md — STRIDE, trust boundaries, risk ratingreferences/owasp-2025.md — OWASP Top 10 2025 with control mapping to skill tiers~30 seconds. Free. No account. Every finding cites a rule and a line of evidence.